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n the wake of the Irish no-vote on the 
Treaty of Lisbon, numerous scenarios 
are currently being debated.
1 This paper 
critically assesses the legality and political 
feasibility of the principal proposals and 
then puts forward an alternative ‘Plan B’, 
which we believe would amply satisfy both 
criteria. 
I.  An assessment of the options currently 
under debate 
1.  Abandon the Treaty of Lisbon and continue 
with the Treaty of Nice 
At first sight, this approach appears to be the easy way 
out. There would certainly be no legal obstacles to 
simply continue on the basis of the current treaties, and 
the experience of the last four years has shown that the 
EU institutions would not break down. Some 
adaptations would have to be made in order to comply 
with a protocol to the Treaty of Nice that stipulates that 
the next Commission needs to have fewer members 
than there are EU member states. Moreover, if a new 
member state were to join the Union (e.g. Croatia), its 
voting weight in the Council of Ministers and its 
number of MEPs would have to be determined.  
From a political perspective, however, to dispose of the 
treaty with a simple ‘funeral’ would be highly 
problematic for the credibility of the European Union. 
It would offer further evidence to those who believe 
that the EU-27 is incapable of reforming its institutions 
and it would shelve all ambitions to construct a Union 
that can act efficiently on critical policy issues such as 
energy, police cooperation and criminal justice or 
foreign and defence policy. 
                                                      
1 See for example Dominik Hierlemann, Irish Vote, Europe’s 
Future: Four options after the “No”, Spotlight Europe 
Special Edition, Bertelsmann Stiftung, June 2008. 
This ‘standstill’ scenario might come about by default 
since the ratification process has rather skewed 
incentives: While failed ratification can often be 
politically costly for individual governments at the 
national level, a delay (or even a halt) to the whole 
ratification process imposes most of the cost on the EU 
and the other member states that wish to proceed. For 
example, following the Irish ‘no’ vote, the governments 
in both the Czech Republic and Poland will have to 
expend even more of their political capital to overcome 
the resistance to ratification by their eurosceptic 
presidents.  
2.  Reopening negotiations on a new Treaty 
While this would be legally feasible, it is politically the 
least likely of all options, at least in the short run. The 
Treaty of Lisbon is already the result of a protracted 
negotiation process after the failure of the 
Constitutional Treaty. Agreement on the Treaty of 
Lisbon was only possible because European leaders did 
not open the complex and carefully crafted compromise 
on institutions and preserved almost everything from 
the Constitutional Treaty.  
Sinn Fein (the only political party in the Irish 
Parliament that campaigned for a ‘no’) has clearly 
stated that a re-opening of the institutional package deal 
would be necessary to satisfy their demands: Ireland’s 
voting weight in the Council would have to remain the 
same as under the Treaty of Nice and there would have 
to be an Irish Commissioner at all times. If such issues 
were to be re-opened, other countries would also make 
additional demands, which means that a full round of 
re-negotiations would have to start after what has 
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already been a decade of institutional haggling and 
navel-gazing. It is thus much more likely that EU 
leaders would simply refrain from launching another 
effort, especially since any new text would again have 
to be ratified and could thus also again fail to secure the 
necessary support. However, negotiations of a new 
Treaty may start after a couple of years if the Treaty of 
Lisbon is not adopted. It is likely that this new treaty 
would then contain a provision allowing it to enter into 
force even if it is not ratified by all member countries 
(i.e. with the consequence that those not ratifying 
would leave the Union) in order to avoid the current 
situation. 
3.  Increased efforts on flexible integration 
Ideas on flexible integration include all kinds of 
scenarios ranging from the establishment of a ‘core 
Europe’ composed of a fixed set of countries to a 
‘Europe à la carte’ in which various groupings of 
countries cooperate on a case-by-case basis on different 
policy issues. Flexible integration could happen inside 
the framework of the existing treaties (according to the 
provisions on ‘enhanced cooperation’), but it could also 
be initiated entirely outside the EU. The latter is more 
likely, as it gives countries complete freedom to design 
the initial rules for cooperation. 
Legally many options are possible, but ‘flexible 
integration’ cannot achieve key institutional reforms 
(e.g. the extension of qualified majority voting or the 
‘double majority’-voting mechanism). From a political 
perspective, flexibility inevitably comes at the price of 
increased incoherence, complexity and a lack of 
transparency. If flexible integration is not matched with 
efforts to consolidate the overall framework, aspirations 
for a European community of values will eventually be 
replaced by a thicket of multilateral treaties and 
agreements that would mark the relations between 
member states. Common standards would be replaced 
by first class and second class members and democratic 
accountability would become even more difficult. In a 
worst-case-scenario, the Treaty of Nice would prove 
too weak a basis for the mounting centrifugal powers 
that result from the various ‘clubs’, so that even the 
community  acquis (e.g. the single market) may be 
called into question over time. 
4.  Implementation of those elements in the 
ToL that do not require ratification  
This approach could only contribute in a very limited 
way to a solution, because – as also for the ‘flexible 
integration’ option – voluntary cooperation cannot 
achieve the key institutional reforms. It would certainly 
be legally possible to pick some elements from the 
treaty, but the vast majority of innovations require 
ratification. Politically, such an approach would also 
send the wrong message, as it is likely to be seen as an 
example of “bureaucratic arrogance from Brussels”. 
For example, even if the post of the High 
Representative in the Council and the Commissioner 
for External Relations could be brought together 
through an inter-institutional agreement, it is likely to 
be regarded as ‘sneaking in’ the Treaty of Lisbon by 
the back door against the will of the Irish people. 
5.  Temporary withdrawal of Ireland from the 
EU 
This idea was put forward by the German Foreign 
Minister Steinmeier, but was immediately dismissed by 
the Irish government and the German Chancellor.  
From a political perspective a bullying approach is not 
acceptable to the EU as a matter of principle. It would 
also set a precedent for other temporary secessions, 
thus weakening the EU institutions.  
From a legal perspective, Ireland clearly cannot be 
forced to withdraw and it remains unclear how the 
institutions should function for that period of 
withdrawal (e.g. the status of Ireland in the internal 
market, the eurozone or the EU institutions would raise 
a host of complicated questions). 
6.  Continuing the ratification process 
followed by a second Irish referendum on 
the Treaty of Lisbon 
By default this seems to be the most likely option to be 
chosen by the European Council. The calculation seems 
to be that a second referendum would have a higher 
chance of succeeding once all other 26 member states 
have ratified. The Irish Prime Minister has not excluded 
the possibility of a second referendum, probably not 
least because other European leaders are pressing him 
hard to present a possible solution. Indeed, the only 
proposal that would save the Treaty of Lisbon and 
guarantee that Ireland would remain a member of the 
EU requires Irish ratification.  
A second referendum on exactly the same matter 
would, however, be problematic for legal and political 
reasons. The relatively high turnout of more than 50% 
and the clear lead of the no-vote (53.7% ‘no’ vs. 46.3% 
‘yes’) imparted a strong legitimacy to the result. 
Although Ireland has a tradition of repeated referenda 
on the same issue (not only on the Treaty of Nice, but 
also on divorce and abortion, for example),
2 it would 
seem rather unlikely that such a clear result could be 
overturned with a second vote. Thus one cannot dismiss 
the possibility that asking exactly the same question 
twice could lead to an act of defiance from the Irish 
people.  
                                                      
2 See Cathryn Costello, “Peoples’ Vengeances – Ireland’s 
Nice Referenda”, European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 
1, 2005, pp. 357–382. What next? How to save the Treaty of Lisbon | 3 
The main problem with this scenario is that it remains a 
high-risk strategy. In the case of a second ‘no’, the EU 
would still be in a legal impasse as the Irish vote would 
continue to function as an efficient veto, even if all 
other countries had ratified. The Treaty of Lisbon 
would effectively be dead, unless some other method is 
found that would allow the Union to proceed even 
without Ireland. A simple way to do so is suggested in 
the next section. 
II.  A politically feasible, legal and fair way 
ahead 
The foregoing overview of six possible scenarios 
illustrates the political and legal shortcomings of 
proposals currently put forward. Most would be legally 
feasible, but would entail considerable political costs. 
In contrast, the following scenario would satisfy both 
legal and political concerns. It would give the Irish 
another say, but whatever the result, they would not be 
able to prevent the other countries that have ratified 
from moving on.  
Plan B: Ratifying the consolidated treaties as 
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon 
If the other member states are really determined to go 
ahead, the solution to the ‘Irish crisis’ could be 
relatively simple: All member states could just sign the 
consolidated version of the treaties as amended by the 
Treaty of Lisbon. This text has recently been published 
in the Official Journal of the EU.
3  
The Irish government could not put its signature to such 
a Treaty at this time, since its population has just voted 
against it, but it would be important not to give the 
impression that the other members are trying to exclude 
a country that has been a successful member of the EU 
for 35 years and has not shown signs of having turned 
Eurosceptic in general. Hence, the Irish government 
should be invited by the European Council to submit 
within in a reasonable time period a set of protocols, or 
opt-outs, which would allow it to sign the treaty and 
have reasonable certainty that the next referendum 
would have a different outcome. 
                                                      
3 See Official Journal of the European Union, C 115, Volume 
51, 9 May 2008, at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do? 
uri=OJ:C:2008:115:SOM:EN:HTML. The EU’s fundamental 
law is the “Treaties”, i.e. the Treaty of Rome (officially, 
Treaty establishing the European Community) and the 
Maastricht Treaty (officially, Treaty on European Union) as 
modified by the many Treaties adopted since 1958. New 
treaties, like the Lisbon Treaty, are a list of amendments and 
deletions that apply to the existing Treaties –which is why 
they are so hard to read. A ‘consolidated text’, which is a re-
writing of the treaties with all the amendments inserted, 
makes it much easier to understand what the law says. 
In the meantime, the consolidated version would be 
thus be signed by 26 (or perhaps 25, if the Czech 
government judges that ratification is difficult). This 
consolidated text would represent a new coherent treaty 
and it could enter into force once it is ratified by all the 
26 member countries that have signed it.
4 Ratification 
of the consolidated text should be possible to achieve 
within a short period of time as no further referenda 
would be necessary and all 26 (or possibly 25) member 
states are committed to ratify the Lisbon Treaty using 
parliamentary procedures (with 18 having already done 
so). 
In those 18 countries that have already ratified the 
Lisbon Treaty, it should actually be possible to use an 
accelerated procedure to (re-)ratify the consolidated 
text, as it contains after all exactly the substance of the 
Lisbon Treaty. The only difference is that this 
substance has been consolidated into one coherent and 
readable text with the existing treaties and that the new 
treaty would have one (or possibly two) member states 
less.  
In those member states where the ratification process is 
still ongoing, the government could inform its 
Parliament(s) that it is now able to present them with 
the consolidated text that results from the incorporation 
of the amending Treaty already under consideration. 
This should not delay ratification unduly. Once all 26 
have ratified the consolidated text, it would be ready to 
enter into force.
5 Using fast-track (re-) ratification 
procedures, this might even be possible in time for the 
next elections of the European Parliament. 
Once (re-)ratification has been completed in the 26, it 
would be entirely appropriate for the Irish government 
to call a second referendum. This referendum would be 
about a different question: Does Ireland wish to join the 
EU(-26) with the Lisbon Treaty in force? At this point, 
another ‘no’ would effectively mean that Ireland would 
leave the EU. Faced with this prospect it is highly 
likely that the Irish would choose to remain in the EU 
even if this meant accepting the essence of the Lisbon 
Treaty – possibly with some additional protocols that 
would clarify guarantees for Ireland on tax policy, 
                                                      
4 To minimise further risks it would be desirable that the 
consolidated version be augmented by only one article which 
would state that this (new) Treaty will enter into force 
(among those which have ratified) once it has been ratified 
by an overwhelming majority of the present members of the 
EU (e.g. 9/10 member states representing at least 90 % of its 
total population of over 500 million). However, this would 
not be necessary at this point, since all 26 have committed to 
ratifying the Lisbon Treaty and this change would represent 
an important departure from the present text, thus possibly 
delaying ratification. 
5 Technically all 26 would then renounce their membership 
of the ‘old’ EU, which they can do anytime since all 
international treaties can be denounced by its signatories. 4 | Daniel Gros & Sebastian Kurpas 
neutrality and abortion (i.e. policy issues that played a 
prominent role in the ‘no’ campaign). 
To put the choice in such stark terms to the Irish 
electorate is entirely appropriate since the requirement 
of unanimity creates a giant external effect: A ‘no’ vote 
imposes a high cost on all EU members. Hence the 
electorate in any one country, especially a small one, is 
entirely rational to vote no. They can thus punish at a 
low cost to themselves their own political class. The 
overwhelming costs in terms of a badly functioning 
Union are borne by the other members. No political 
system can survive for long under such a misaligned 
incentive structure. 
The ratification of the consolidated Treaties is thus the 
only scenario that is both legally and politically 
feasible. With the content of the Treaty remaining 
exactly the same, no further negotiations would be 
necessary. Ratification by the 26 could be fast and 
would lead to a situation in which an Irish ‘no’ would 
not prevent them from advancing. Finally, a second 
referendum would confront the Irish with two very 
concrete and easily understandable alternatives: in or 
out. 
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